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I. INTRODUCTION
In addition to an upset winner and nationwide sensation in Funny Cide,2 the 2003
Kentucky Derby produced a great deal of controversy. While the cheating
allegations against, and subsequent exoneration of, winning jockey Jose Santos are
well known,3 less so is another issue which may have significant impact both on the
future of horse racing and the First Amendment. During the running of the Derby,
Santos and thirteen of his fellow riders wore patches on their pants promoting the
Jockeys’ Guild.4 The patches, which measured 3 by 5 inches, were determined by
the Churchill Downs’ stewards to violate a regulation which prohibits jockeys from
wearing advertising during a race.5 The stewards, therefore, fined each rider who
wore the patch $500.6 Following an unsuccessful appeal to the Kentucky Racing
Commission (the “Commission”),7 the jockeys have filed suit in Kentucky state court
seeking to have the fines overturned.8
Desormeaux v. Kentucky Racing Commission raises a number of significant First
Amendment issues. After providing the background of the case and discussing
issues related to jockey advertising, this article will analyze the Desormeaux
plaintiffs’ claims under a variety of First Amendment doctrines, including: political
speech, commercial speech, public employer, and public forum. The article
concludes that the jockeys present a strong First Amendment challenge to the
regulation as applied in Desormeaux, but that on the larger issue of jockey
advertising the Commission has valid arguments in support of the prohibition.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Controversy Over Jockey Advertising
Professional athletes “have been endorsing products as long as there has been a
medium to record or broadcast [their] exploits.”9 In recent years, these endorsement
2

At odds of 12-1, Funny Cide became the first gelding to win the Derby since 1929 and
the first New York-bred winner ever. Andrew Beyer, Funny Cide Up, WASH. POST, May 4,
2003, at E1.
3
Shortly after the race, media across the country reported on a picture appearing to show
Santos with a black object — possibly an illegal electrical device with which to shock Funny
Cide — in his hand while aboard the horse. Andrew Beyer, Derby Stewards on Wrong Track,
WASH. POST, May 13, 2003, at D1. Ultimately, the “object” was determined to be an optical
illusion. Id. The Churchill Downs’ stewards thus cleared Santos of wrongdoing. Id.
4

Marty McGee, Riders file suit over logos worn in Kentucky Derby, DAILY RACING FORM,
Nov. 9, 2003, at 3. The Jockeys’ Guild is the labor union for jockeys. Id.
5

Id.

6

Id.

7

Id.

8

See Desormeaux v. Kentucky Racing Comm’n, Petition for Review of Final Order of
Kentucky Racing Commission, No. 03CI09792 (Jefferson Cir. Ct., Ky., Nov. 6, 2003)
[hereinafter Petition]. On November, 17, 2003, the case was transferred to Franklin Circuit
Court. See Nov. 17, 2003 Order (Jefferson Cir. Ct., Div. 3).
9

Sean Wood, Athlete Endorsements Sell, HAMILTON SPECTATOR, Aug. 26, 2002, at B11.
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deals have become increasingly lucrative, culminating in Nike’s $90 million, seven
year contract with LeBron James, the number one pick in the 2003 National
Basketball Association draft.10 In horse racing, it is not individual athletes but rather
premier events, such as the Derby and the Breeders’ Cup, that “are saturated with
core sponsors.”11 Most prominent is Visa’s sponsorship of the Triple Crown — i.e.,
the Derby, the Preakness, and the Belmont Stakes — with its $5 million bonus to the
winner of all three races.12
Jockeys do not receive a direct financial benefit from corporate sponsorships of
races.13 But like other independent contractor athletes, such as golfers or tennis
players,14 many jockeys15 are interested in making “extra income from endorsement
deals.”16 This desire, in turn, has given rise to the notion of jockeys entering
contracts to wear advertising or promotional messages during races.17
Traditionalists, however, oppose such promotion or advertising, in particular because
they do not “want jockeys to look like NASCAR drivers.”18 Thus, the wearing of
advertising or other promotional items by jockeys “has been a hot-button issue for
years in a number of racing jurisdictions throughout North America.”19
10
Id.; Jeff Caplan, Megadeals That Were, and Weren’t, FT. WORTH STAR TELEGRAM, Jan.
4, 2004, at 2C.
11
Marcus Green, Suit Could Open Door to Ad Laden Jockeys, THE COURIER-JOURNAL,
Nov. 12, 2003, at F1.
12

Andrew Beyer, Tight Schedule Puts Squeeze on Preakness Field, WASH. POST, May 14,
2003, at D1.
13

Green, supra note 11.

14

In 2002, tennis player Venus Williams “signed a reported five-year, $40 million US deal
with Reebok, which would be the richest endorsement contract for a female athlete.” Wood,
supra note 9. Likewise, golfer Tiger Woods’ endorsement deals reportedly earn him $100
million annually. Masuoka Brandon, Golfers Weigh in on Wie’s Future, THE HONOLULU
ADVERTISER, Mar. 29, 2004, at 2C.
15

Larry Stumes, California Jockeys Giving Wearable Ads a Leg Up, S. F. CHRONICLE, Apr.
23, 2002, at C6 (noting that “[n]early all of [California’s] riders have signed with Jockeys
Management Group,” an organization founded to pursue marketing deals for jockeys).
16
Green, supra note 11. While the value of jockey endorsement deals would not be
expected to even approach the levels of athletes in other sports, any additional income would
be beneficial because, among other reasons, jockeys are “responsible for their own expenses,
including insurance premiums, which are astronomical because of the risk inherent in the
profession.” Billy Reed, Patch or No Patch, Jockeys are Just Climbing Aboard the Train of
Corporate Sponsorship, SNITCH, Nov. 26, 2003, at 7. While some top jockeys, such as Jerry
Bailey, may make over $2 million a year, others “barely make a living.” Id. The lower a
jockey is on the economic scale, obviously “the more burdensome the insurance premiums
become.” Id.
17

Green, supra note 11.

18

Reed, supra note 16. According to Albert Fiss, vice-president of the Jockeys’ Guild, the
Desormeaux lawsuit will come down to whether the courts look at racing tradition “as more
important than the First Amendment.” Green, supra note 11 (quotations omitted).
19
McGee, supra note 4; see Dave Joseph, “Shock Mode”: This Space Available; A
Tradition-Bound Sport Resists Corporate Ads on Jockey Apparel, SUN-SENTINEL, July 9,
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Regulations on jockey attire vary from state to state, but generally “racetracks
and government regulators have been able to control advertising rights despite the
collective protestations of jockeys.”20 Not entirely, however. While Kentucky bans
jockey advertising,21 California and New York permit it, subject to certain
limitations.22 Thus, in the 2003 Belmont Stakes, held in New York, “some jockeys
wore patches advertising Wrangler and Budweiser,” reportedly angering Visa, the
sponsor of the Triple Crown.23 Later in 2003, during the Breeder’s Cup at Santa
Anita Park, the California racing board suspended that state’s rule permitting
advertising by jockeys.24 The California board’s suspension of jockey advertising
was viewed as an effort to “protect some or all of the sponsors or marketing partners
that participate in the Breeder’s Cup . . . .”25
2003, at 1C. Unlike in North America, advertising on “jockeys’ clothing [is] common in
European racing . . . .” Kevin Modesti, Skimming Way to Classic, THE DAILY NEWS OF LOS
ANGELES, July 27, 2001, at S8.
20

McGee, supra note 4; see Green, supra note 11 (quoting R.J. Kors, founder of Jockeys
Management Group, which has marketing agreements with more than 150 riders: “How can
you look at a professional jockey as any different from any other professional athlete that’s an
independent contractor? . . . How can an industry suppress an economic opportunity for a
jockey’s career?”) (quotations omitted); see Joseph, supra note 19 (quoting Jerry Bailey:
“We’re the lowest paid athletes on the field . . . I don’t think you can deny us the opportunity
to make money through advertisements if it’s done under certain guidelines.”) (quotations
omitted).
21

See 810 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 1:009, § 14 (2002). Minnesota likewise prohibits such
advertising. See MINN. R. 7877.0170(3)(L) (2003).
22

See 4 CAL. BUS. & PROF. § 1691(b) (2004); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. title 9,
§ 4041.6 (2004). Other state regulations are silent on the issue, see, e.g., MASS. REGS. CODE
title 205, § 4.15 (2004); ILL. ADMIN. CODE title 11, § 1411.05 (2004); TEX. ADMIN. CODE title
16, § 313.406 (2004); MD. REGS. CODE title 09, § 10.01.21 (2004); OHIO ADMIN. CODE
§ 3769-6-26 (2003); W. VA. CODE S.R. § 178-1-45 (2004), although some require that jockeys
wear “traditional” or “conventional” attire, see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. title 13, § 402-001-8.13
(2004); ARK CODE ANN. title 6, § 06-003-2162 (2004); 58 PA. CODE § 163.175 (2004); LA.
ADMIN. CODE title 46, § 741 (2002), which presumably would exclude advertising.
23

Reed, supra note 16. The jockeys in question, Jerry Bailey and Jose Santos, reportedly
received “five-figure deals” to wear the logos. Joseph, supra note 19. Bailey put on a
“Wrangler hat in the winner’s circle after riding Empire Maker to victory in the Belmont.”
Id.; see also Sigrid Kun, Race Horses and Intellectual Property Rights: Racing Towards
Recognition?, 17 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 207, 225 n.167 (1997) (describing one jockey at
Remington Park being sponsored by Pepsi and wearing its logo during workouts and races);
Notes, Skip Away Captures Massachusetts Handicap, THE SPORTS NETWORK, June 1, 1997
(jockeys in the race allowed to wear advertisements on their silks after officials determined
there was nothing in Massachusetts regulations barring riders from wearing promotional
materials). In addition, jockeys, including certain of the plaintiffs in Desormeaux, have
allegedly worn the Jockey Guild patch in races at tracks in California, Illinois, Maryland, and
Texas. Petition, ¶ 42.
24

Green, supra note 11.

25

Id. (quotations omitted). Corporate sponsors of races “may feel undercut” by jockey
advertising, particularly promotions by competing brands, a phenomenon known as “ambush
marketing.” Id. (quotations omitted). See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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Following the Belmont and Breeder’s Cup controversies, Desormeaux is the
“third salvo” in the “growing battle” over jockey advertising.26 Both sides agree that
the First Amendment issues presented may ultimately require resolution by the
United States Supreme Court.27
B. Desormeaux Proceedings Before the Commission
The Kentucky Legislature has “vest[ed] in the [C]ommission forceful control of
horse racing in the Commonwealth,” giving it “plenary power to promulgate
administrative regulations prescribing conditions under which all legitimate horse
racing and wagering thereon is conducted . . . .”28 The Commission’s purpose is to
ensure horse racing in Kentucky is of the “highest quality and free of any corrupt,
incompetent, dishonest, or unprincipled” practices, and to “maintain the appearance
as well as the fact of complete honesty and integrity of horse racing in the
Commonwealth.”29 Pursuant to this authority, the Commission has enacted
comprehensive rules governing horse racing, including, inter alia, jockey attire.30
Specifically, the Commission prohibits jockeys during a race from wearing any
“advertising, promotional, or cartoon symbols or wording” which is “not in keeping
with the traditions of the turf.”31
On the appeal of their fines, the Commission determined that the Desormeaux
jockeys’ purpose in wearing the Guild patch during the Derby was “to promote their
organization and gain more members.”32 The Commission, however, deemed this
purpose to be commercial, rather than political, finding that the patch “is an
advertising and promotional symbol.”33 Further, because the traditional attire of a
“jockey does not include advertising or promotional symbols,” the Commission
concluded that wearing the patch violated the regulation.34 In addition, the
Commission reasoned that wearing the patch “could be a distraction to the eye and

26

Green, supra note 11.

27

Id. (quoting J. Bruce Miller, attorney for the Commission: “It probably is a Supreme
Court case if it keeps going.”); see Tom Wolski, Jockeys Protest, THE VANCOUVER PROVINCE,
Nov. 16, 2003, at A68 (quoting Darrell Haire, representative for the Jockeys’ Guild: “We will
take this as far as it has to go, even if that means the Supreme Court.”).
28

KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 230.215 (2002).

29

Id. On January 6, 2004, Governor Ernie Fletcher announced that he was abolishing the
Commission and replacing it with a new entity called the Kentucky Horse Racing Authority.
Editorial, A Clean Break, THE COURIER-JOURNAL, Jan. 8, 2004, at A6; Tom Loftus, State’s
Top Racing Official Resigns, THE COURIER-JOURNAL, Jan. 15, 2004, at B1. In addition to
regulating racing, the new body will be charged with promoting the sport. Id. For
consistency, this article will refer to the defendant in Desormeaux as “the Commission.”
30

See 810 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 1:009.

31

Id. at § 14; see Petition, ¶ 22.

32

Commission’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law [hereinafter Conclusion of
Law], attached as Exhibit A to the Petition, Finding of Fact No. 8 [hereiafter Finding of Fact].
33

Conclusion of Law, supra note 32, at No. 9.

34

Conclusion of Law, supra note 32, at No. 8.
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effect the concentration of the stewards in the performance of their duties.”35
Whether the Commission found the patch in fact to be a distraction is unclear,
particularly given its later statement that “allow[ing] the patch in this case could lead
down the slippery slope where the jockeys would resemble NASCAR drivers and
therefore hinder the stewards in the performance of their duties.”36
In contrast to the Commission’s characterization, the Desormeaux plaintiffs
explicitly disavow any commercial intent in wearing the patch, and instead allege
that the emblem merely “identified the jockeys as members of their labor union
. . . .”37 Further, the jockeys allege that the purpose of “wearing the patch was to
promote their labor union, to increase membership in the union and to bring to the
attention of the public the unconscionable plight of disabled jockeys.”38 Thus, the
jockeys assert, inter alia, that being fined for wearing the patch violated their First
Amendment rights.39
C. Overbreadth Challenge
As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that the Desormeaux plaintiffs have
challenged the regulation on overbreadth grounds.40 The overbreadth doctrine is a
“departure from traditional rules of standing,”41 allowing an individual to “challenge
a statute on its face ‘because it also threatens others not before the court — those
who desire to engage in legally protected expression but who may refrain from doing
so rather than risk prosecution . . . .’”42 A law should be invalidated for overbreadth

35

Finding of Fact, supra note 32, at No. 12 (emphasis added).

36

Conclusion of Law, supra note 32, at No. 12 (emphasis added).

37

Petition, supra note 8, at ¶ 47.

38

Id. at ¶ 32. In some states, including Kentucky, tracks will pay a disabled jockey up to
$100,000. Reed, supra note 16. As noted, however, jockeys are responsible for their own
insurance premiums, which can be prohibitively expensive. Id. Thus, even with a payment
from the track, a catastrophic injury can leave a jockey with no way to pay his medical
expenses. Id. And the dangerousness of a jockey’s life cannot be overstated: the Jockeys’
Guild receives “an average of twenty-five hundred injury notifications per year, with two
deaths and two and a half cases of paralysis.” LAURA HILLENBRAND, SEABISCUIT: AN
AMERICAN LEGEND, 73 (Ballantine Books, 2001). As of 2001, the Guild was “supporting fifty
riders who were permanently disabled on the job.” Id.
39

Petition, supra note 8, at ¶ 16; see U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . .
. abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .”). The provisions of the First
Amendment are incorporated against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. Schneider v.
State, 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939).
40

Petition, supra note 8, at ¶ 51.

41

Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973). Generally, “courts will not assess the
constitutionality of a provision apart from its particular application.” Newsom v. Albemarle
County Sch. Bd., 354 F.3d 249, 257 (4th Cir. 2003). Cases involving freedom of speech,
however, “are frequently excepted from this general rule.” Id.
42
Board of Airport Comm’rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 574 (1987) (citation
omitted). The Desormeaux plaintiffs who are before the court challenging the fines for
wearing the Guild patch are, of course, equally affected by the advertising ban.
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only if “it reaches a substantial number of impermissible applications,”43 and no
“‘limiting construction’ or ‘partial invalidation’ could ‘remove the seeming threat or
deterrence to constitutionally protected expression.’”44 If a law is overbroad, “any
enforcement” of it is “totally forbidden.”45 Conversely, if a law is found
unconstitutional “as applied,” it may not be applied to the challenger, but otherwise
remains in effect.46
Under the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the First Amendment, certain classes
of speech have more value than others; that is, different standards govern restrictions
on different types of speech.47 Thus, the proper characterization of the Desormeaux
jockeys’ wearing the Guild patch — i.e., whether this amounts to commercial speech
or so-called “pure speech” — is of critical importance in determining the validity of
the regulation as applied by the Commission.48 Because a state “cannot foreclose the
exercise of constitutional rights by mere labels,”49 the Commission’s terming the
patch an “advertising or promotional symbol,” that consequently is subject to
regulation, will likely not be dispositive.50 Rather, as will be discussed, there is a
compelling argument that wearing the patch constitutes “pure speech,” which is
entitled to full First Amendment protection.51 On the broader question, however, of
whether true commercial speech can be prohibited in these circumstances, the
Commission has good arguments in support of the regulation.52
III. CORE FIRST AMENDMENT SPEECH: STRICT SCRUTINY
A. Overview of Political Speech Doctrine
While the First Amendment’s free speech guarantee is recognized as a
fundamental right,53 it is equally well recognized that this right is not “absolute at all

43
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 771 (1982). An overbreadth plaintiff must show
“that a regulation’s overbreadth is ‘not only . . . real, but substantial as well, judged in relation
to the [challenged regulation’s] plainly legitimate sweep . . . .’” Newsom, 354 F.3d at 258
(quoting Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613).
44
Id. (quoting Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613, 615). This is not to say, however, that a court
will rewrite a law “to conform it to constitutional requirements.” Virginia v. Am. Booksellers
Ass’n, Inc., 484 U.S. 383, 397 (1988).
45

Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613.

46

City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 758-59 (1988).

47

See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995) (noting that
lower court “applied a significantly more lenient standard than is appropriate in a case of this
kind”).
48

See infra Section III.

49

NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963).

50

See Conclusion of Law, supra note 32, at No. 9.

51

See infra Section III.

52

See infra Sections IV-VI.

53

Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942). In the words of the Supreme
Court, the First Amendment secures “the great, the indispensable democratic freedoms.”
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times and under all circumstances.”54 Thus, there are “certain well-defined” classes
of speech which may be prohibited consistent with the First Amendment.55 On this
low end of the constitutional spectrum are things like “fighting words,” which have
no protection under the First Amendment.56
Conversely, discussion of public issues — so-called “political speech” — is
afforded the broadest protection by the First Amendment.57 In Pickering v. Board of
Education, the Supreme Court characterized the “public interest in having free and
unhindered debate on matters of public importance” as the First Amendment’s “core
value.”58 Restrictions on such speech are subject to the most stringent form of
review, strict scrutiny.59
Of relevance to Desormeaux, communications which attempt to persuade or
dissuade the joining of labor unions are considered core speech protected by the First
Amendment.60 To illustrate, in Thomas v. Collins the defendant was cited for
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945). As is oft noted, the First Amendment’s purpose
is “to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which the truth will ultimately prevail
. . . .” Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Communications Comm’n, 507 U.S. 1301, 1304
(1993) (quotations omitted). Consequently, the First Amendment generally bars the
government “from dictating what we see or read or speak or hear.” Ashcroft v. Free Speech
Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 245 (2002).
54

Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571. For example, in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52
(1919) (citation omitted), the Supreme Court recognized that “the character of every act
depends upon the circumstances in which it is done. The most stringent protection of free
speech would not protect a man falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.” While
admitting that “in many places and in ordinary times” the defendants would have been within
their constitutional rights to distribute a circular objecting to the military draft, in the context
of World War I the Court held that such activity was not protected by the First Amendment:
“When a nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance
to its effort that their utterance will not be endured . . . .” Id.
55

Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571.

56

Id. In Chaplinsky, the Supreme Court affirmed the defendant’s conviction for violating a
statute that prohibited a person from addressing another with “offensive” words in public,
reasoning that such “fighting words” were not entitled to protection under the First
Amendment. Id. at 569, 571-72.
57

Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).

58

391 U.S. 563, 573 (1968). In Pickering, a public school teacher was fired after sending a
letter critical of the school board to his local newspaper. Id. at 564. The Supreme Court ruled
the firing violated the First Amendment, holding that “absent proof of false statements
knowingly or recklessly made by him, a teacher’s exercise of his right to speak on issues of
public importance may not furnish the basis for his dismissal from public employment.” Id. at
574 (footnote omitted).
59

McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 347 (“When a law burdens core political speech, we apply
‘exacting scrutiny,’ and we uphold the restriction only if it is narrowly tailored to serve an
overriding state interest.”) (citations omitted). In addition, strict scrutiny requires there be no
less restrictive alternative available. United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529
U.S. 803, 813 (2000).
60

National Labor Relations Bd. v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469, 477, 479
(1941).
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contempt for violating a restraining order prohibiting him from soliciting members
for certain unions without first obtaining an organizer’s card.61 In reversing the
conviction, the Supreme Court noted that the right “to discuss, and inform people
concerning, the advantages and disadvantages of unions and joining them is
protected” free speech.62 Thus, the Court concluded that the defendant’s First
Amendment rights had been violated.63
Similarly, in Thornhill v. Alabama the Supreme Court recognized that “the
dissemination of information concerning the facts of a labor dispute must be
regarded as within that area of free discussion that is guaranteed by the
Constitution.”64 The Court further termed “[f]ree discussion concerning the
conditions in industry and the causes of labor disputes” to be “indispensable.”65
Accordingly, the Court found unconstitutional a law which prohibited publicizing the
facts of a labor dispute in the vicinity of the dispute, and reversed the defendant’s
conviction for picketing outside a business involved in a strike.66
B. Expressive Conduct Equally Protected
While the First Amendment explicitly refers to “speech,” it is well established
that expressive conduct is also protected.67 Indeed, the Supreme Court has “long
recognized” that the First Amendment’s “protection does not end at the spoken or
written word.”68 For example, in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District a group of high school students wore black arm bands to school in
protest of Vietnam.69 They were then suspended from school.70 In reversing the
61
323 U.S. 516, 518 (1945). The defendant was the president of the International U.A.W.
and resided in Detroit. Id. at 520. He came to Texas to give a speech to local union members
and supporters. Id. Prior to his speech, a state court issued an order enjoining the defendant
from soliciting members for any union without first obtaining an organizer’s card, as required
by statute; the defendant violated this order. Id. at 521.
62

Id. at 532.

63

Id. at 532, 543.

64

310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940).

65

Id. at 102, 103; see also Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U.S. 468, 478 (1937)
(“Members of a union might, without special statutory authorization by a State, make known
the facts of a labor dispute, for freedom of speech is guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.”).
66

Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 91-92, 101.

67
Perhaps the most famous constitutional recognition of expressive conduct is Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989), where the Supreme Court struck down a state statute
which prohibited flag burning. See also Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974)
(reversing conviction for improper exhibition of United States flag where defendant displayed
flag upside down with peace symbol attached). But see United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S.
367, 382 (1968) (rejecting First Amendment challenge to conviction for burning draft card;
Court “cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled
‘speech’ whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea”).
68

Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404.

69

393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969).

70

Id.
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dismissal of the students’ subsequent suit against the school officials, the Supreme
Court reasoned that wearing the armbands “was closely akin to ‘pure speech’ which,
we have repeatedly held, is entitled to comprehensive protection under the First
Amendment.”71
Recently, in Newsom v. Albemarle County School Board, the federal Fourth
Circuit, reviewing the denial of a preliminary injunction, held there was a strong
likelihood of success on a First Amendment claim against a school dress code which
prohibited messages on clothing related to weapons.72 Applying the Tinker
standard,73 the court concluded the dress code could “be understood as reaching
lawful, nonviolent, and nonthreatening symbols of not only popular, but important
organizations and ideals.”74 Because the code excluded a “broad range and scope of
symbols, images, and political messages that are entirely legitimate and even
laudatory,” the court held the injunction should have been granted.75
C. Political Speech Analysis of Desormeaux
In Desormeaux, the plaintiffs allege that they wore the Guild patch to promote
their union, increase its membership, and bring attention to the issue of disabled
jockeys.76 This should be considered protected speech under Thomas and Thornhill,
in that the jockeys allegedly were promoting their union and raising awareness of the
dangerousness of their working conditions.77 Further, under the reasoning of Tinker
and Newsom, wearing the patch can be considered a form of expressive conduct
protected by the First Amendment.78

71

Id. at 505-06. The Court acknowledged the need for school officials, “consistent with
fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the schools.” Id. at
507. But, given there was no evidence of conduct which would “‘interfere with the
requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school,’” the Court concluded
the prohibition on armbands violated the First Amendment. Id.
72
354 F.3d 249, 251 (4th Cir. 2003). In Newsom, a student sought a preliminary injunction
against the school dress code after being disciplined for wearing a tee-shirt which “depicted
three black silhouettes of men holding firearms superimposed on the letters ‘NRA’ positioned
above the phrase ‘SHOOTING SPORTS CAMP.’” Id. at 252.
73
The court recognized there was no evidence that clothing with messages related to
weapons “disrupted school operations or interfered with the rights of others.” Id. at 259.
74

Newsom, 354 F.3d at 259-60. As an example, the court noted the code would prohibit
clothing depicting the state seal of Virginia, which shows a woman holding a spear. Id. at
260. Likewise, the court reasoned that the “quintessential political message” the school was
trying to promote—“‘Guns and School Don’t Mix’”—would be prohibited by the code. Id. at
260.
75

Id.

76

Petition, supra note 8, at ¶ 32.

77

See Thomas, 323 U.S at 532; Thornhill, 310 U.S at 102, 103.

78

See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 505-06; Newsom, 354 F.3d at 260. The Commission, of course,
could argue that the patch is “disruptive” based on its finding that the stewards could be
distracted by it. See Finding of Fact No. 12; Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507. Given, however, that
this finding was posited as a “slippery slope” consideration, see Conclusion of Law No. 12,
such an argument is not particularly persuasive, especially when balanced against the high
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Indeed, in a similar case, In re Reynolds, the California Supreme Court held that
an inmate’s First Amendment rights were violated when he was denied permission to
wear a prisoner’s union button while incarcerated.79 Under this rationale, the
Desormeaux plaintiffs appear to have a valid “as applied” First Amendment
challenge to the regulation at issue. Whether that regulation should be struck down
on overbreadth grounds, however, is another issue, initially requiring analysis of the
commercial speech doctrine.
IV. COMMERCIAL SPEECH: INTERMEDIATE STANDARD
A. Distinction Between Content-Based v. Neutral Restrictions Inapplicable
Traditionally, the First Amendment has given life to the “principle that each
person should decide for him or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression,
consideration, and adherence.”80 A regulation that “stifles speech on account of its
message” — i.e., its content — “contravenes this essential right.”81 Such restrictions
“pose the inherent risk that the Government seeks not to advance a legitimate
regulatory goal, but to suppress unpopular ideas or information or manipulate the
public debate through coercion rather than persuasion.”82 In other words, through
content-based restrictions the “‘Government may effectively drive certain ideas or
viewpoints from the marketplace.’”83 To prevent an outcome so obviously contrary
to the First Amendment, the Supreme Court has “consistently applied strict scrutiny
to content-based regulations of speech.”84
Determining whether a particular regulation is content-based is “not always a
simple task.”85 The general rule, however, is that “laws that by their terms
distinguish favored speech from disfavored speech on the basis of ideas or views
expressed are content-based.”86 Singling out commercial speech for prohibition
while leaving other forms of speech untouched — which the regulation at issue in
First Amendment value afforded speech promoting unions. See supra notes 60, 63 and
accompanying text.
79
599 P.2d 86, 87 (Cal. 1979). In so holding, the court noted there was no evidence of
“disruption” in the prison, either past or future, caused by wearing the button. Id. at 88; cf.
Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 129 (1977) (finding ban
on inmate union meetings and solicitation reasonable where such activities could pose
“additional and unwarranted problems and frictions in the operation of the State’s penal
institutions”).
80
Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Communications Comm’n, 512 U.S. 622, 641
(1994).
81

Id.

82

Id.

83
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105,
116 (1991).
84

Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 574 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring);
Turner Broadcasting, 512 U.S. at 641-43.
85

Turner Broadcasting, 512 U.S. at 642.

86

Id. at 643.
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Desormeaux does — arguably amounts to a content-based restriction, which
ordinarily would be subject to strict scrutiny.87 Despite being content-based,
however, restrictions on commercial speech do not receive strict scrutiny.88
B. Overview of Commercial Speech Doctrine
On the contrary, commercial speech has a checkered history under Supreme
Court precedents.89 In an early case, Valentine v. Chrestensen, the Supreme Court
held that the First Amendment provided no “restraint on government as respects
purely commercial advertising.”90 Reversing course, in Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., the Court held that simply
because an advertiser’s “interest is a purely economic one . . . hardly disqualifies him
from protection under the First Amendment.”91 Rather, recognizing that society has
a “strong interest in the free flow of commercial information,”92 the Court struck
down regulations prohibiting the advertising of prescription drug information.93
Later, in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission,
the Supreme Court settled on an intermediate standard for determining whether
commercial speech is protected by the First Amendment.94 Under this standard, a
court examines: (1) whether the speech concerns lawful activity and is not
misleading; (2) whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial; (3) whether
the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted; and (4) whether
the regulation is not more extensive than necessary to serve that interest.95 In Board
87

See 810 KRA 1:009, § 14 (banning commercial, but not other types, of speech). In fact,
the Desormeaux plaintiffs have alleged that Pat Day, one of the other jockeys in the Derby,
during the race wore a tunic with the symbol of a Crucifix, but was not fined by the stewards.
Petition, supra note 8, at ¶¶ 39, 41.
88

Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 n.6
(1980) (applying intermediate standard to commercial speech and noting “[i]n most other
contexts, the First Amendment prohibits regulation based on the content of the message”).
Indeed, even restrictions on advertising for particular products receive only intermediate
review. See Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 554 (applying intermediate review to restrictions on
tobacco advertising); id. at 574-75 (Thomas, J., concurring).
89

Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 574 (“There was once a time when this Court declined to give any
First Amendment protection to commercial speech.”) (Thomas, J., concurring).
90

316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).

91

425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976); see also Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975)
(Advertising is not “stripped of all First Amendment protection. The relationship of speech to
the marketplace of products or of services does not make it valueless in the marketplace of
ideas.”).
92
Virginia State Board, 425 U.S. at 764; see, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517
U.S. 484, 495 (1996) (“Advertising has been a part of our culture throughout our history,”
providing “vital information about the market.”).
93

Virginia State Board, 425 U.S. at 764, 772.

94

447 U.S. 557 (1980).

95

Id. at 566. Expounding on the interest necessary to sustain a restriction on commercial
speech, the Court has noted that a state “must demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and
that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material degree.” Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol52/iss3/4

12

2004-05] THE RUN FOR THE ROSES MEETS THE FIRST AMMENDMENT 383
of Trustees v. Fox, the Supreme Court clarified that the last Central Hudson factor
requires only a “reasonable fit” between the regulation and the interest, rather than
the least restrictive means available.96
The Central Hudson test has been criticized on a number of grounds, including
its flexibility,97 which leaves “both sides of the debate with their own well of
precedent from which to draw.”98 Indeed, several members of the Supreme Court
“have expressed doubt about the Central Hudson analysis and whether it should
apply in particular cases.”99 In addition to its malleability, another significant
problem with the doctrine involves the difficulty in identifying commercial speech,
as opposed to more protected forms.100 In fact, the Court has expressly declined to
define the necessary elements of commercial speech.101 Relatedly, the jurisprudence
treats all speech as “either commercial or noncommercial,” with the former receiving
less protection, despite the reality that some messages can carry both commercial
and noncommercial meanings.102
For instance, in Nike, Inc. v. Kasky the California Supreme Court held that certain
statements made by Nike during a labor dispute amounted to commercial speech,
despite the fact the statements were made in response to “public criticism.”103
Because the speech was deemed commercial, the court reasoned that any false or
misleading statements by Nike were not protected by the First Amendment, again

761, 770-71 (1993); see also Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass’n, Inc. v. United States,
527 U.S. 173, 188 (1999) (restrictions on commercial speech require more than “mere
speculation or conjecture”).
96

492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989).

97

See Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 574 (“the Court has followed an uncertain course — much of
the uncertainty being generated by the malleability of the four-part balancing test of Central
Hudson”) (Thomas, J., concurring).
98

Floyd Abrams, A Growing Marketplace of Ideas, LEGAL TIMES, July 26, 1993, at S28;
Compare, e.g., Cincinnati v. Discovery Network Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993) (holding ban on
newsracks containing commercial handbills, but not newspapers, unconstitutional) with United
States v. Edge Broadcasting, 509 U.S. 418 (1993) (upholding federal statute prohibiting radio
and television stations from airing lottery advertisements in states where lotteries are illegal)
and Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc’s v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328 (1986) (upholding
restrictions on casino advertising in Puerto Rico).
99

Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 554 (citations omitted).

100

Id. at 575 (“I doubt whether it is even possible to draw a coherent distinction between
commercial and noncommercial speech.”) (Thomas, J., concurring); Robert Post, The
Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 7 (2000) (the “impossibility
of specifying the parameters that define the category of commercial speech has haunted its
jurisprudence and scholarship”).
101
See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 67 n.14 (1983) (“We express
no opinion as to whether reference to any particular product or service is a necessary element
of commercial speech”).
102

Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 45 P.3d 243, 268 (Cal. 2002) (Brown, J., dissenting).

103

Id. at 247.
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without regard to whether they were related to a matter of public concern.104 In
dissent, one justice contended that because “the gap between commercial and
noncommercial speech is rapidly shrinking,” the Central Hudson doctrine — with its
lesser value for speech deemed commercial, regardless of the speech’s connection to
public issues — “fails to account for the realities of the modern world.”105
The Supreme Court, however, has seen “no need to break new ground.”106
Rather, in commercial speech cases Central Hudson remains an “adequate basis for
decision.”107
C. Commercial Speech Analysis of Desormeaux
In affirming the Desormeaux plaintiffs’ fines, the Commission identified two
interests furthered by the prohibition on jockey advertising: (1) upholding the
“traditions of the turf,” and, relatedly, (2) protecting the ability of the stewards to
perform their duties, i.e., ensuring the integrity and safety of the sport.108 The latter
interest, in particular, would seem to be “substantial” within the meaning of Central
Hudson.109 Whether the advertising ban “directly advances” that interest, and
whether there is a “reasonable fit” between the ban and the interest, are potential
battlegrounds.110
Specifically, on the issue of “reasonable fit,” there is a question as to whether all
advertising or promotional symbols, regardless of size, have the ability to interfere
with the stewards’ performance.111 The Commission, of course, concluded that even
the 3 by 5 inch Guild patch, much less larger symbols, “could be a distraction to the
eye and effect the concentration of the stewards in the performance of their
duties.”112 The reasonableness of this determination will be significant in

104

Id. at 262. The state may ban all “commercial speech ‘that is fraudulent or deceptive
without further justification,’ but may not do the same to fraudulent or deceptive speech in
‘matters of public concern.’” Id. at 268-69 (Brown, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
105

Id. at 269 (Brown, J., dissenting); see Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, The Anti-History
and Pre-History of Commercial Speech, 71 TEX. L. REV. 747 (1993); Kozinski & Banner,
Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech, 76 VA. L. REV. 627 (1990).
106

Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 554 (quotations omitted). The Supreme Court initially granted
certiorari to review Nike, but then withdrew the writ as “improvidently granted.” Nike, Inc. v.
Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 2554 (2003).
107

Lorillard, 533 U.S at 555 (quotations omitted).

108

See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.

109

447 U.S at 564, 568-69; see KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 230.215 (Commission’s purpose is
to maintain “complete honesty and integrity of horse racing in the Commonwealth”); Baffert
v. California Horse Racing Bd., 332 F.3d 613, 618 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Preserving the integrity of
racing is a significant interest, especially in view of the fact that California permits wagering
on horse racing.”).
110

Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.

111

Id.

112

See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol52/iss3/4

14

2004-05] THE RUN FOR THE ROSES MEETS THE FIRST AMMENDMENT 385
determining whether the ban satisfies the Central Hudson standard.113 But in any
event, given the lesser value placed on commercial speech and the substantial state
interest promoted by the advertising ban, the Commission has at least a colorable
argument that the ban is constitutional under Central Hudson.114
V. PUBLIC EMPLOYER RESTRICTIONS: WIDE LATITUDE FOR THE GOVERNMENT
A. Overview of Public Employer Doctrine
Another possible avenue of defense for the Commission is to argue that it should
be considered a public employer for purposes of analyzing the advertising ban. In
Pickering, the Supreme Court recognized the need to strike “a balance between the
interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public
concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of
the public services it performs through its employees.”115 Under the public employer
doctrine, when an employee’s “expression cannot be fairly considered as relating to
any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community,” government
regulation “should enjoy wide latitude.”116 Moreover, even when an employee’s
speech arguably addresses matters of public concern, the expression can still be
regulated if it “threatens to interfere with government operations.”117
In a recent case, Perez v. Hoblock, the court relied on the public employer
doctrine to uphold the New York racing board’s fine of a horse owner.118 The board
fined the owner $3,000 following his “profanity-laced verbal and physical outburst”
at a meeting he requested with stewards for the Saratoga racetrack.119 The regulation
under which the owner was fined permitted such a penalty for “any action

113
This point is obviously a bone of contention in Desormeaux. Asked about the
Commission’s determination that advertising on jockeys’ pants could obscure the stewards’
view, Mr. Fiss, the Guild vice-president, responded: “That’s reaching. That’s probably the
most polite way I could put it.” Green, supra note 11 (quotations omitted). On the contrary,
defense attorney Miller contends “the jockey’s uncluttered white breeches make it easier for
the stewards to determine if a rider has done something wrong.” Id.
114
Whether the “traditions of the turf,” standing alone, would be an interest sufficient to
justify the prohibition is more problematic. See supra note 18.
115
391 U.S. at 568. This balance is similar to the consideration given, when measuring
First Amendment claims, to the need to maintain discipline and order in public schools and
prisons. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507; Jones, 433 U.S. at 129.
116

Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983).

117

Lewis v. Cohen, 165 F.3d 154, 162 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 823 (1999). In
Connick, 461 U.S. at 140, a government employee was terminated after circulating a
questionnaire “concerning internal office affairs.” The Supreme Court held the firing did not
violate the employee’s First Amendment rights, as it was reasonable to believe the
questionnaire “would disrupt the office, undermine [the supervisor’s] authority, and destroy
close working relationships.” Id. at 154.
118

248 F. Supp. 2d 189 ( S.D.N.Y. 2003).

119

Id. at 190, 191. The owner sought the meeting to raise his concerns regarding the
manner in which certain horses were selected to run in certain races. Id. at 191. When told by
one official that his complaint was “ridiculous,” the owner began his outburst. Id.
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detrimental to the best interests of racing.”120 The owner filed suit challenging this
provision on First Amendment grounds; the court found the public employer doctrine
applicable because the owner was “a licensee in an industry closely regulated by
defendants.”121
Rejecting his claim, the court looked to the first Pickering factor and noted that
the owner was fined for disrupting the meeting with the stewards, not for
“commenting on a matter of public concern.”122 In addition, the court recognized
that the disruption of the meeting prevented the stewards from performing their
duties — hearing and considering the owner’s alleged grievance.123 Thus, the court
reasoned that whatever value the owner’s speech possessed was outweighed by its
interference with efficient government operations.124 Accordingly, the court
concluded the owner’s “disruptive and threatening behavior need not be” protected
by the First Amendment.125
Similarly, in Leroy v. Illinois Racing Board, the federal Seventh Circuit rejected
a horse owner’s First Amendment challenge to sanctions levied by the state racing
board.126 As in Perez, the owner was fined for making threats and using profanity, in
violation of a regulation which prohibited “improper language” or “improper
conduct” towards members of the board.127 In response to the owner’s argument that
the regulation was vague and overbroad, the court conceded that “addressed to the
general public for the conduct of daily affairs, [the rule] would be seriously
deficient.”128 Addressed solely to licensees, however, and governing only their
relations with the board, the court considered the regulatory scheme to have “much
in common with civil service laws, which despite their many vague terms were
sustained” by the Supreme Court.129 The court therefore held the regulation did not
violate the First Amendment.130

120

Id. at 192; see N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. title 9, § 4022.13.

121

Id. at 192-93, 195.

122

Perez, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 197.

123

Id.

124

Id.

125

Id. at 195 (quotations omitted); see Heil v. Santoro, 147 F.3d 103, 109 (2d Cir. 1998)
(“The government can prevail if it can show that it reasonably believed that the speech would
potentially interfere with or disrupt the government’s activities, and can persuade the court
that the potential disruptiveness was sufficient to outweigh the First Amendment value of that
speech”) (citations omitted).
126

39 F.3d 711, 715 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1131 (1995). The Perez court
cited Leroy in support of its decision. 248 F. Supp. 2d at 196.
127

Leroy, 39 F.3d at 715.

128

Id.

129

Id.; see Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 607-15; CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 568-81
(1973).
130

Leroy, 39 F.3d at 715.
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B. Public Employer Analysis of Desormeaux
The Desormeaux plaintiffs are licensees in the same regulated industry as the
owners in Perez and Leroy.131 Thus, the Commission may attempt to argue that
under the public employer doctrine the jockey advertising ban is proper.132 Key to
such an argument would be: (1) showing that advertising worn by jockeys would not
constitute “comment on a public matter,” or, perhaps more likely, (2) that the
advertising would interfere with the stewards in the performance of their duties.133
On the first factor, it is worth noting that in Perez and Leroy the owners were
fined for profanity and making threats, forms of speech that have little to no First
Amendment value.134 Conversely, advertising is protected by the First Amendment,
although not to the same extent as “pure” or “political” speech.135 Given the lesser
value placed on commercial speech, it is not clear whether jockey advertising would
be considered as relating to any matter of “social” or “other concern to the
community.”136 If not, then the advertising ban could be upheld under the public
employer doctrine.137
Assuming arguendo that jockey advertising would be considered “comment on a
public matter,” the analysis then entails whether such communications would
interfere with government operations — i.e., the stewards’ duties in officiating the
races.138 As noted, the Commission determined that even the Guild patch could
distract the stewards from performing their duties.139 If this determination is
reasonable, then the advertising ban could again be upheld under the public employer
doctrine.140
VI. PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE
A. Overview of Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions
Finally, the Commission may argue that the advertising ban is a valid restriction
of speech in a non-public forum. Because the First Amendment is not absolute, even

131

See 810 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 1:009.

132

See supra notes 118-30 and accompanying text.

133

See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.

134

See supra notes 119 & 127 and accompanying text.

135

See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.

136

Connick, 461 U.S. at 146. Obviously, the content of the advertising would be critical in
making this determination. And again, this assumes that certain communications are either
commercial speech or something else, for example, political speech. See Nike, 45 P.3d at 268
(Brown, J., dissenting); see supra note 102 and accompanying text. In reality, commercial
speech can be blended with other, more protected forms of expression, although the
jurisprudence has not yet recognized this fact. Nike, 45 P.3d at 268-69 (Brown, J., dissenting).
137

Connick, 461 U.S. at 146.

138

See supra note 117 and accompanying text.

139

See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.

140

See Perez, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 195.
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in a public forum the government may impose “reasonable restrictions on the time,
place, or manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions ‘are justified without
reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to
serve a significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative
channels for communication of the information.’”141 In contrast, in a non-public
forum, a lesser standard applies: the government may prohibit all forms of
communication, provided the ban is reasonable and content-neutral.142
The public forum determination is based on “how the locale is used. Streets,
parks and sidewalks are the paradigms of a public forum because they have
traditionally served as a place for free assembly and communication by citizens.”143
Likewise, “municipal theaters and auditoriums are designed for and dedicated to
expressive activities” and therefore are considered public forums.144
In International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. New Jersey Sports
and Exposition Authority, the federal Third Circuit affirmed an order denying a
religious society the right to distribute literature and solicit funds at the
Meadowlands Sports Complex, which includes a football stadium and racetrack.145
In so holding, the court concluded that the Meadowlands, despite being a public
place, was not a public forum.146 On the contrary, according to the court, the
Meadowlands did not fit any of the traditional definitions of a public forum, but
instead was a “commercial venture” aimed at “earn[ing] money by attracting and
entertaining spectators with athletic events and horse races.”147
Because the Meadowlands was not a public forum, the court looked only to
whether the solicitation ban was reasonable.148 This, in turn, was determined by
whether the “proposed activity is basically incompatible with the normal character
and function of the place.”149 Concluding that the proposed solicitation would
“disrupt the normal activities of the [Meadowlands],” the court held the ban
reasonable, and denied the First Amendment challenge.150
141

Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (citations omitted). In Ward,
the Supreme Court upheld noise control measures for a public bandshell, concluding that the
regulation was content-neutral and a narrowly tailored restriction on the time, place, and
manner of protected speech. Id. at 791, 803.
142
United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns, 453 U.S. 114, 131
n.7 (1981).
143
International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. New Jersey Sports and
Exposition Auth., 691 F.2d 155, 160 (3d Cir. 1982) (citing Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 515
(1939)).
144

Id. (citing Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 555 (1975)).

145

Id. at 158. With the sole exception of concessionaires, no one was permitted to solicit
funds or distribute literature at the Meadowlands. Id.
146

Id. at 159 (“Not all public places are public forums.”).

147

Id. at 161.

148

International Society for Krishna Consciousness, 691 F.2d at 161.

149

Id. (citations omitted).

150

Id.
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B. Public Forum Analysis of Desormeaux
Given the above, the Commission could argue that Churchill Downs is, like the
Meadowlands, a non-public forum.151 That is, it could be argued that the purpose of
Churchill Downs, and more specifically the track itself, is to be a place where horse
races are run, not where messages are expressed. The question then would be the
reasonableness of the jockey advertising ban.152 The Commission’s determination
that the Guild patch could interfere with the stewards’ duties would, if reasonable,
satisfy this burden.153 In addition, whether advertising is “basically incompatible
with the normal character and function of” the track could implicate the “traditions
of the turf,” which the Commission has determined do not include commercial
messages worn by jockeys.154 Thus, the advertising ban could be upheld as a
reasonable restriction of speech in a non-public forum.155
VII. CONCLUSION
The Desormeaux plaintiffs present a compelling “as applied” challenge to the
jockey advertising ban in that they have been fined for essentially “pure speech,” i.e.,
wearing union patches. On the issue of overbreadth, however, the Commission has
good arguments in support of the prohibition, particularly given the lesser value
accorded commercial speech and the other theories under which the ban could be
upheld. Whatever the ultimate outcome, Desormeaux has the potential to make
significant First Amendment law, as well as impact the future of the horse racing
industry.

151
Unlike the Meadowlands, Churchill Downs is privately owned.
See
www.churchilldowns.com. The Supreme Court, however, has applied the public forum
analysis even to “conduct occurring on private property.” Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501
U.S. 560, 566 (1991) (citing Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986)). Thus, the
track’s purpose should govern its public forum status, not whether it is public or private
property.
152

Id.

153

Id.; see supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.

154

See supra note 34 and accompanying text.

155

See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
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